Bitcoin Security

Google Quantum Paper Shrinks Bitcoin Break Cost 20x

10 min read
MH
Written by Mohamed Habbat

The math on breaking Bitcoin just got worse

I work in the crypto self-custody space, and March 30, 2026 marks a clean before and after. That day Google Quantum AI published a paper (arXiv:2603.28846) that cuts the estimated hardware needed to break Bitcoin's keys by nearly 20 times and backs the result with a zero-knowledge proof. Nothing broke that day, but the time left to prepare got shorter.

The authors are Babbush, Zalcman, Gidney, Broughton, Khattar, Neven, Bergamaschi, Drake and Boneh. Their circuits solve the 256-bit elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem on Bitcoin's secp256k1 curve with about 1,200 logical qubits and 90 million Toffoli gates, or about 1,450 logical qubits and 70 million (arXiv:2603.28846). On superconducting hardware that comes to fewer than 500,000 physical qubits, which the paper calls "nearly a 20 fold reduction" over the previous best, Litinski's 2023 estimate (arXiv:2306.08585).

Google's own Willow chip, announced in December 2024, has 105 qubits (Google). Do not turn that into a countdown. The same paper argues that counting physical qubits fails to capture progress, which comes in jumps when a platform clears an error-correction threshold (Google Quantum AI whitepaper). In my view the paper is a data point, and it makes the eventual crisis easier to see.

TL;DR

Google's March 30, 2026 paper (arXiv:2603.28846) puts the cost of breaking a Bitcoin key at fewer than 500,000 physical qubits, nearly 20 times below the previous estimate. No quantum computer can break Bitcoin today. The paper counts a little over 1.7 million BTC in old P2PK outputs and about 6.9 million BTC in all outputs whose public key is already on-chain. A fresh bc1q address hides its public key until you spend. A Taproot bc1p address does not. Two draft proposals, BIP-360 and BIP-361, outline a migration path. NIST published its first post-quantum standards, one for key exchange (FIPS 203) and two for signatures (FIPS 204 and 205), on August 13, 2024 (NIST). SHA-256 and Proof of Work face no practical quantum threat. Prepare, but do not panic.

What the paper says

Read the author list once. Ryan Babbush, the first author, and most of his co-authors work at Google Quantum AI, the team that builds Google's quantum chips. Dan Boneh is a computer scientist at Stanford. Justin Drake is at the Ethereum Foundation in Zug (arXiv:2603.28846). Most of the authors build the hardware the paper is about.

Their contribution is a set of optimizations to Shor's algorithm for the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) under Bitcoin's signatures. The two circuits trade qubits for gates: 1,200 logical qubits and 90 million Toffoli gates, or 1,450 logical qubits and 70 million. With 10^-3 physical error rates and planar connectivity, the paper puts either one below 500,000 physical qubits and says they "can execute in minutes" (arXiv:2603.28846).

I like how the team handled disclosure. They published a zero-knowledge proof that the circuits exist, without publishing the circuits (Google Quantum AI whitepaper). Anyone can check the claim, and nobody gets the attack blueprint. In my view, that buys the community time.

A separate paper the same day, Cain et al. (arXiv:2603.28627), looks at neutral-atom qubits instead of superconducting ones. It finds Shor's algorithm possible with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits, and estimates a few days to break a key on the P-256 curve with 26,000 qubits. That is far slower than Google's minutes, because atom systems run slower error-correction cycles. Google's paper draws the same line between "fast-clock" and "slow-clock" machines. Two groups on two hardware paths both landed between 10,000 and 500,000 qubits. To me that matters more than either paper alone.

The same paper is also posted as IACR ePrint 2026/625.

Why the attack window matters

Bitcoin proves ownership with digital signatures: ECDSA, and since Taproot also Schnorr. Both rest on the elliptic curve problem, so both fall to Shor's algorithm (Google Quantum AI whitepaper). Your private key signs. Your public key verifies. A classical computer cannot work back from the public key to the private key. A large enough quantum computer can. For how keys and seed phrase security relate, the BIP39 guide covers the mechanics.

Your exposure depends on when, and whether, your public key is visible.

On-spend exposure is the time-sensitive case. When you broadcast a transaction, your public key sits in the mempool until a miner includes it. The Google paper estimates that a superconducting machine kept in a "primed" state could derive the private key about 9 minutes after it sees the public key, against Bitcoin's average block time of about 10 minutes (Google Quantum AI whitepaper). That overlap is why the authors say the first fast-clock machines would enable on-spend attacks.

At-rest exposure affects coins whose public key is already on-chain. The paper says P2PK outputs, the dominant type in the "Satoshi Era" of 2009 to 2010, hold a little over 1.7 million BTC, nearly 9% of all bitcoin (arXiv:2603.28846). It puts the total across all script types with an exposed key at about 6.9 million BTC. An attacker can hit these at any time, without waiting for a transaction.

For how Bitcoin addresses and key formats work, see Sending & Receiving Bitcoin and Technical Deep Dive.

The gap is real and the timeline is not infinite

Google's own machine is far from 500,000 qubits. Willow has 105 (Google). On the neutral-atom side, Cain et al. cite trapping arrays of more than 6,000 coherent qubits (arXiv:2603.28627). The Google authors warn that the final stages of the race may not be public, and that a public demonstration of Shor's algorithm on a 32-bit curve "should not be seen as a wake-up call" but as a sign that migration has already failed (Google Quantum AI whitepaper).

On March 25, 2026, Google set 2029 as its own deadline to migrate to post-quantum cryptography (Google). The post names progress in quantum hardware, error correction and factoring estimates as the reason, and moves authentication and signatures up the queue. When the company that builds the hardware sets its own deadline, I read that as a signal about the window.

NIST adds structure. Its first three post-quantum standards came out on August 13, 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, from CRYSTALS-Kyber) for key exchange, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, from CRYSTALS-Dilithium) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, from SPHINCS+) for signatures (NIST). A NIST draft from November 2024, IR 8547, proposes deprecating ECDSA at 112-bit security after 2030 and disallowing ECDSA at every strength after 2035 (NIST IR 8547 ipd). That draft is still not final. Bitcoin does not answer to NIST. The wider ecosystem's schedule still gives you a useful floor for thinking about urgency.

What should register is velocity. The paper places its own result in a "general pattern of quantum algorithmic improvements", the same pattern that shrank the cost of breaking RSA-2048 (arXiv:2603.28846). In my view, attacks get better. They do not revert.

Which addresses show their public key

Bitcoin addresses do not carry equal exposure. The table below sorts the common types by what an attacker can see before you spend, using the Google paper's own classification (Google Quantum AI whitepaper).

Script typeAddress starts withPublic key on-chain before you spend?At-rest risk
P2PK(no address format)YesExposed
P2PKH1No, only a hashNone unless reused
P2WPKHbc1qNo, only a hashNone unless reused
P2TRbc1pYes, a tweaked keyExposed

Every type is exposed on-spend. Reuse breaks the "No" rows: once you spend from an address, its public key is on-chain, and the paper says coins still sitting there become as vulnerable as P2PK.

The paper says accounts believed to belong to Satoshi Nakamoto hold about 1 million BTC behind P2PK scripts, and that most of the 1.7 million P2PK bitcoin has not moved since 2009 (arXiv:2603.28846). The private keys may be lost. The owners may be unreachable.

That raises a policy question the paper takes on directly. It notes that many jurisdictions could classify taking abandoned coins as theft, argues the coins will be taken anyway if the protocol does not change, and discusses a legal framework for "digital salvage". The Bitcoin community has not settled the question. BIP-361 proposes first stopping sends to quantum-vulnerable addresses, then restricting old-signature spends behind a rescue protocol (BIP 361). I expect that debate to be loud.

The two Bitcoin proposals

Post-quantum work in Bitcoin predates this paper. BIP-360 was assigned its number on December 18, 2024 (BIP 360).

Both proposals are drafts. BIP-360, by Hunter Beast, Ethan Heilman and Isabel Foxen Duke, defines Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR): Taproot with the key path spend removed, so no public key sits on-chain (BIP 360). It does not add post-quantum signatures yet; the Google paper calls it a security patch for the Taproot regression. BIP-361, with Jameson Lopp as first author, sets out two phases: about 3 years (160,000 blocks) after activation, no more sends to vulnerable scripts, then 2 years later, tighter rules on ECDSA and Schnorr spends (BIP 361). For the full analysis, read BIP-360 and BIP-361: Bitcoin's Quantum Upgrade Path.

The engineering constraints are real. Post-quantum signatures are larger. An ML-DSA-44 signature is 2,420 bytes (FIPS 204), against at most 73 bytes for a Bitcoin ECDSA signature including its sighash byte (BIP 66). That hits block space, fees and throughput. Any signature change needs a soft fork that the network has to adopt. Bitcoin upgrades move slowly on purpose. Developers can solve these problems, just not quickly.

For how Bitcoin's protocol architecture handles upgrades, see Technical Deep Dive.

What to do right now

Stop reusing addresses. Once you spend from an address, its public key is on-chain for good, and anything left on that address is exposed (Google Quantum AI whitepaper). The Bitcoin whitepaper already advised that "a new key pair should be used for each transaction" (whitepaper). Most modern wallets hand you a fresh address each time.

Pick the address type with the threat in mind. For coins you plan to hold for years, a fresh bc1q address hides the public key until you spend. A Taproot bc1p address shows a tweaked public key from the moment it receives coins, so the Google paper counts it as exposed at rest. The Bitcoin self-custody guide covers wallet choice in detail.

Check your old wallets. If you have been in Bitcoin since the early days and still hold coins in P2PK outputs or on an address you already spent from, moving them to a fresh bc1q address is the most concrete step available to you.

Follow BIP-360 and BIP-361 in the bitcoin/bips repository. When post-quantum proposals reach activation, the network will need to coordinate. Understand the timeline now and you are not scrambling when the upgrade ships.

For wallet security practices, see Wallets: Staying Secure. For privacy practices that also reduce quantum exposure, see Bitcoin Privacy.

References

  1. Babbush, R., Zalcman, A., Gidney, C., Broughton, M., Khattar, T., Neven, H., Bergamaschi, T., Drake, J., Boneh, D. "Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies against Quantum Vulnerabilities: Resource Estimates and Mitigations." arXiv:2603.28846, March 30, 2026. Also IACR ePrint 2026/625. Full PDF: quantumai.google
  2. Cain, M. et al. "Shor's algorithm is possible with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits." arXiv:2603.28627, March 30, 2026.
  3. Litinski, D. "How to compute a 256-bit elliptic curve private key with only 50 million Toffoli gates." arXiv:2306.08585, June 2023.
  4. NIST. FIPS 203, 204 and 205, released August 13, 2024. NIST announcement. NIST IR 8547 (Initial Public Draft), November 2024. csrc.nist.gov
  5. Google. "Quantum frontiers may be closer than they appear," March 25, 2026. blog.google

What's next

New to Bitcoin? Start with Chapter 1. It covers the foundation you need to understand the rest of this article.

Already holding? Review your wallet setup in Wallets: Staying Secure and confirm you use a fresh bc1q address for each receive. That combination is your best protection today.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can quantum computers break Bitcoin today?
No. Google's March 2026 paper (arXiv:2603.28846) estimates that breaking a Bitcoin key needs fewer than 500,000 physical qubits. Google's own Willow chip has 105 qubits. The paper also warns that qubit counts are a poor measure of progress and that the final steps may not be public.
How many qubits are needed to break Bitcoin?
Google's paper (arXiv:2603.28846) builds two circuits: about 1,200 logical qubits with 90 million Toffoli gates, or about 1,450 logical qubits with 70 million. On superconducting hardware with a 10^-3 error rate that means fewer than 500,000 physical qubits, nearly 20 times fewer than Litinski's 2023 estimate.
Is my Bitcoin wallet safe from quantum attacks?
It depends on the address. A bc1q (P2WPKH) or legacy 1 (P2PKH) address that has never spent hides its public key behind a hash, so the Google paper calls it immune to at-rest attacks. A Taproot bc1p address puts a tweaked public key on-chain, so the paper counts it as exposed, like old P2PK outputs.
How much Bitcoin is at risk from quantum attacks today?
The Google paper counts a little over 1.7 million BTC in P2PK outputs, including Satoshi-era mining rewards, and about 6.9 million BTC across all script types with an exposed public key. See the BIP-360/361 deep dive for the protocol path.
Are SHA-256 and Bitcoin mining at risk from quantum computers?
No. Grover's algorithm gives only a quadratic speed-up on hash search. The Google paper says error-correction overhead consumes almost all of that gain and Grover does not parallelize well, so it calls attacks on Proof of Work not practically relevant. The threat targets signatures, not mining.
What should a Bitcoin holder do about this right now?
Three steps. Move any early P2PK coins, and coins on an address you already spent from, to a fresh, unused bc1q address. Stop reusing receiving addresses. Follow BIP-360 and BIP-361 in the bitcoin/bips repository. Nothing has to happen this week, but the paper urges migration without delay.